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ABSTRACT  
 
The paper presents the results of field tests of a technique 
for detection of spoofing signals using the direction-of-
arrival (DOA) measurements obtained by processing 
signals of an adaptive antenna array. The detection of 
spoofing signals is achieved by comparing and statistical 
testing of the measured DOAs against the DOAs 
predicted with the ephemeris data. Because the attitude of 
the antenna array is assumed to be unknown and has to be 
estimated, the detection of spoofing signals is treated as a 
joint detection/estimation problem. For performing the 
field tests, a simple version of spoofing, so called 
meaconing, has been realized using a repeater of the in-air 
GNSS signals. The performance of the proposed 
technique has been investigated for both static and 
dynamic user cases.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
For those applications of global satellite navigation 
systems (GNSSs) which rely on the open-service 
navigation signals the reliable detection of spoofing 
attacks is of great importance. This is especially true for 
the applications with safety- and security-critical content. 
A great deal of research has been performed on finding 
solutions to the problem of GNSS spoofing, see for 
instance [1], [2] and references herein. Among the 
receiver-autonomous techniques for spoofing detection, 
the approach based on the use of spatial angles of arrival 
is considered to be the most powerful [3] as it enables to 
detect even the most sophisticated spoofing techniques 
realizable in practice. 
 
The use of the spoofing detection based on spatial angle 
of arrival comes at price of more complex hardware 
because it requires multiple receiving antennas and RF 
front-ends as well as high computational power in digital 
signal processing. However the implementation of this 
approach in a GNSS receiver utilizing the technology of 
adaptive antenna arrays for radio interference mitigation 
is relatively simple and might only require a modification 
of the receiver baseband signal processing software. The 
array signal processing in such a receiver is used to 
control the array reception pattern with the help of 
adaptive beamforming and nulling. The estimation of the 
directions of arrival (DOAs) of incoming signals can be 
used to constrain the adaptive beamforming and nulling 
processes, for example to maintain a constant gain and 
phase responses of the array system in the direction of a 
GNSS satellite. For this purpose the DOA estimation was 
also implemented in the demonstrator of a GNSS receiver 
with an adaptive antenna, GALANT [4], that is being 
developed by the Institute of Communications and 
Navigation of DLR. Recently, a technique [5] based on 
the use of the estimated directions of arrival of GNSS 
signals for a joint detection of spoofing and estimation of 
the array attitude has been proposed by the group of 
authors from the GALANT development team.  
 
The advantages of using an array processing technique for 
direction finding for purposes of spoofing detection can 
be summarized as follows: 
- this approach is fully complemental and can be easily 
used in combination with other spoofing detection 
techniques; 
- directional information about spoofing signals can be 
used to mitigate them by generating spatial null(s) in 
the array reception pattern (see for example [6]); 
- a network of GNSS receivers with antenna arrays 
performing the DOA estimation and detecting 
spoofing signals can enable the localization of 
spoofing transmitters. 
 
Additionally, as discussed in [3], the multi-antenna 
techniques for spoofing detection can be only fooled by 
several phase-synchronous spoofing transmitters placed 
around the victim receiver. In order to produce consistent 
DOA estimations, the spoofing signals must be phase-
aligned in such a way that the carrier phases of their sums 
at each array element correspond to the phases of the 
authentic signals. The required number of the 
synchronous transmitters is defined by the number of 
array elements which is usually equal or greater than four. 
As it can be seen, this scenario quickly becomes 
unfeasible in practice as it would require multiple 
precisely synchronized transmitters, exact knowledge 
about the coordinates of the array elements and about the 
characteristics of the propagation channel between the 
transmitters and the antenna array. 
 
In the current paper we present results of field tests of the 
technique developed in [5]. A simple version of spoofing, 
so called meaconing or rebroadcast, was used in these 
tests. Apart from simple realization, the investigation of 
this type of spoofing has also practical interest since such 
interference is hard to handle with alternative approaches 
while it can also occur unintentionally. For example, 
improper installed repeaters aimed to improve indoor 
availability of GPS can act as meaconing sources [7]. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives 
a short overview of the technique under test for joint 
spoofing detection and antenna attitude estimation that 
was proposed in [5]. Further in the next section, the 
results for a static user in interference-free signal 
conditions are presented. Results for static and dynamic 
users under meaconing signal conditions are discussed in 
the next two sections, correspondingly. The summary of 
the results and conclusions are given in the last section. 
 
 
TECHNIQUE UNDER TEST 
 
In order to discriminate between the spoofing and 
authentic GNSS signals, the technique proposed by the 
authors in [5] makes use of the direction of arrival 
information collected for all received signals. One part of 
this information comes from the positioning module of 
the receiver that, among others, calculates azimuth 𝐴𝑧 and 
elevation 𝐸𝑙 angles of each visible GNSS satellite as 
viewed from the estimated user position. These angles are 
given in the local user’s east-north-up (ENU) coordinate 
frame. The second part of the spatial information is 
obtained through estimation of the actual directions of 
arrival (𝜑,𝜃) of each satellite signal with the help of one 
of array signal processing methods for direction finding 
[8]. In this case, the estimated directions are referenced to 
the local antenna coordinate frame.  
 
Under conditions without spoofing and meaconing, the 
DOAs predicted while performing the positioning 
solution and the ones estimated in the antenna array 
processing should be consistent with each other. The 
relationship between the 𝑁DOA DOAs in these two sets 
can be mathematically formulated as follows: 
 
𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 + 𝐍 (1) 
 
where 
𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐  is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix composed of 𝑁DOA unit 
vectors of directional cosines describing the directions 
of arrival of satellite signals in the local coordinate 
frame of the antenna array. A single directional cosine 
vector is defined as 
𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐 = [sin𝜃 cos𝜑 , sin 𝜃 sin𝜑 , cos 𝜃]T, 
where 𝜃 is the elevation angle and 𝜑 is the azimuth 
angle in the antenna local coordinate frame; 
𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix composed of unit vectors of 
directional cosines corresponding to the DOAs of 
satellite signals in the user ENU coordinate frame. 
Each such vector is defined as follows 
𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢 = [cos𝐸𝑙 sin𝐴𝑧 , cos𝐸𝑙 cos𝐴𝑧 , sin𝐸𝑙]T 
where 𝐸𝑙 and 𝐴𝑧 are the elevation and azimuth angles, 
correspondingly, in the ENU coordinate frame; 
𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) is a [3 × 3] unitary rotation matrix (see [9], 
p.441) describing to the attitude of the antenna array 
defined by three Eulers angles: roll 𝑟, pitch 𝑝 and yaw 
𝑦. These angles are referred to the user local ENU 
coordinate frame; 
𝐍 is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix describing the measurement 
noise effect. Further for simplicity, we assume that the 
noise components follow Gaussian distributions with 
zero means and, in general case, different standard 
deviations 𝜎1,𝜎2, … ,𝜎𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴.   
The antenna attitude is estimated by solving (1) for Euler 
angles (𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) in the least squares sense: 
 (?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑦�) = arg
𝑟,𝑝,𝑦 min‖𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐‖2 . (2) 
 
The least squares problem (2) can be solved iteratively by 
linearizing the non-linear cost function around some 
initial set of roll, pitch and yaw angles (𝑟0, 𝑝0,𝑦0) using 
the Taylor expansion of the first order. As shown in [5], 
the iterative formulation for the solution of (2) is given by 
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 and 𝛁 is a vector differential operator defined as 
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so that the gradient term [𝛁𝐠T(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) ]T produces the 
following [3 × 3]  matrix  
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The starting set of Euler angles (𝑟0, 𝑝0,𝑦0) in (3) can be 
calculated using the elements of the least-squares 
estimation 𝐑� of the rotation matrix [9]: 
 
𝐑� = arg 
𝐑
 min‖𝐑 𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐‖2 , (7) 
 
and 
tan 𝑟0 = −𝑅�13𝑅�33, tan𝑝0 = − 𝑅�23
�𝑅�21
2 + 𝑅�222 , 
tan𝑦0 = −𝑅�21𝑅�22. 
(8) 
 
Please note that the formulation of (7) does not account 
for the side condition 𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)𝐑T(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) = 𝐈 that 
originates from the definition of a rotation matrix. The 
least squares problem formulated by (7) is known in the 
literature as the Wahba's problem. A computationally 
effective solution of the problem is available using the 
singular value decomposition (SVD) technique [10]. 
 
The quality of the solution for the antenna attitude can be 
assessed using the sum of squares of errors (SSE) test 
statistics similar to how it is used with receiver 
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) techniques. The 
SSE metric is defined as follows 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = trace{[𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐]T ⋅ 
 𝐑𝑁−1[𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐]}, (9) 
 
where the inverse of the covariance matrix of the 
measurement noise 𝐑𝑁−1   is used for normalizing 
individual residuals of the least squares solution. Further, 
we assume that the individual DOA measurement errors 
are Gaussian and not correlated with each other and the 
matrix 𝐑𝑁 is a diagonal matrix consisting of the error 
variances, 𝜎12,𝜎22, … ,𝜎𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴2 . 
 
If no systematic offsets observed between the measured 
and predicted DOAs of the GNSS signals, the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric 
defined by (9) follows a central chi-squared distribution 
with 𝑘 =  (2𝑁DOA − 3) degrees of freedom. In another 
case, if all or some of the measured DOAs are biased with 
respects to predicted DOAs, the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric follows a 
non-central chi-squared distribution with the same 
number of degrees of freedom as above but with some 
non-zero non-centrality parameter 𝜆: 
 H0(no error):  𝑆𝑆𝐸~𝜒2(𝑘) H1(error):        𝑆𝑆𝐸~𝜒′2(𝑘, 𝜆) 
𝑘 =  (2𝑁DOA − 3) 
𝜆 = � �Δ𝑛
𝜎𝑛
�
2
𝑁DOA
𝑛=1
 
(10) 
where  
Δ𝑛 is the bias in the 𝑛-th DOA measurement, this bias 
is expressed as a spatial angle 𝜓𝑛 between two 
direction cosines vectors of the measured DOA 
𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐,𝑛 and the predicted “almanac” DOA 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑛:  
 
Δ𝑛 = 𝜓𝑛 = arccos�𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐,𝑛T 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑛�, (11) 
 
𝜎𝑛 is the standard deviation of the 𝑛-th DOA 
measurement error given in units of the spatial 
angle 𝜓𝑛.  
 
An example of probability density functions (pdfs) of the 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 test statistics for H0 and H1 hypothesis are shown in 
Figure 1. These numerical results were obtained by Monte 
Carlo simulations of DOA measurements for seven GNSS 
satellites. The standard deviation of the DOA 
measurement error was assumed to have the elevation 
dependence shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 1: Pdfs of 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test metric for H0 and H1 
hypotheses 
 
In simulations for the H1 case, a single bias was 
introduced into the fifth DOA measurement: Δ5 = 12.5° 
so that  (Δ5 𝜎5⁄ )2 = 34.17.  
 
 
Figure 2: Approximation of dependency of DOA 
measurement error on satellite elevation in antenna local 
coordinate frame 
 
As can be observed in Figure 1, the detection of the 
systematic biases in DOA measurements can be 
performed by using the Neyman-Pearson criterion, i.e. by 
setting a threshold for the SSE test metric defined by 
some desired false alarm rate. The presence of the 
systematic biases can then serve as one of indications of 
spoofer / meaconing attacks.  
 
In practice, other sources of the DOA measurements 
biases have to be taken into account. The most common 
sources of such biases are the electromagnetic mutual 
coupling between the array elements and the multipath 
propagation. In order to evaluate the effects of these error 
sources on the false alarm performance of the proposed 
technique, the first tests were carried out in interference-
free signal conditions. The results of these tests are 
presented in the next section. 
 
 
FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE 
 
For investigating the false alarm performance of the 
technique for joint spoofing detection and attitude 
determination, the 2-by-2 rectangular adaptive antenna of 
the DLR GALANT receiver (see Figure 3, a) was 
mounted on the roof of the DLR Institute of 
Communications and Navigation in Oberpfaffenhofen 
(see Figure 3, b).  
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Figure 3: View of (a) GALANT multi-antenna receiver 
and (b) antenna array roof installation 
 
Blocks of the array signal data were collected in each 
mutli-antenna satellite tracking channel and used in the 
post-processing by a direction finding technique. In this 
study we used a unitary ESPRIT algorithm [11], [12] that 
is also used for the real-time DOA estimation in the 
receiver. The data blocks were collected simultaneously 
for up to 14 satellites signals being tracked by the 
receiver. Each array signal sample consists of complex-
value outputs of four prompt PRN-code correlators. A 
single data block corresponds to the 50 ms of observation 
time and is of size [4 × 50].  
 
The exemplary results for the estimated antenna attitude 
using two different non-overlapping sets of 1 hour of 
array signals data each are shown in Figure 4. The mean 
and standard deviations of the estimated Euler angles are 
given in Table 1. 
 
 
a) set #1 
 
b) set #2 
Figure 4: Estimated attitude of antenna array 
 
It can be observed in Figure 4 that the estimated Euler 
angles may experience changes of up to 7-8 degrees over 
a time interval of several minutes. This is especially true 
for pitch and roll angles. The means and standard 
deviations estimated over 1 hour time window into two 
different data sets are consistent with each other.  
 
 Yaw Pitch Roll 
Mean (∘) 156.99 2.22 4.27 
Std. (∘) 1.09 1.94 1.53 
a) set #1 
 Yaw Pitch Roll 
Mean (∘) 157.14 1.40 3.48 
Std. (∘) 1.00 1.66 1.41 
b) set#2 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviations of the attitude 
estimates performed on real DOA measurements 
 
In order to account for DOA estimation biases due to the 
multipath and array mutual coupling effects, the entire set 
of DOA measurements was allowed to contain up to 
𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋 “natural” biases. The hypothesis H1 is then 
assumed to be true if only any of the possible subsets with  
𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴 − 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋 measurements delivers the SSE test 
metric above the detection threshold (see [5] for more 
details). In this study the value 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 3 was 
adopted. The accounting for the possible “naturally” 
biased DOA measurements results in the number of DOA 
measurements used for the attitude determination that 
changes with the time. This effect is illustrated by Figure 
5. These results were obtained with the satellite elevation 
mask of 10°. As can be observed in Figure 5, the number 
of the actually used DOA measurements changes 
significantly and can fall down to 5 measurements even 
under open sky, interference-free conditions. 
 
 
a) set #1 
 
b) set #2 
Figure 5: Number of estimated DOAs used for attitude 
determination 
 
The next figure, Figure 6, presents the results for SSE test 
metric observed in the same two time windows as in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5. Please note that the detection 
threshold for the spoofing event in each time epoch 
depends on the number of used DOA measurements. The 
results of testing the SSE statistics against the detection 
threshold are shown in Figure 6 as a status of the joint 
detection and estimation process. The status has three 
possible states: “valid”, “too few DOAs” and “spoofing”. 
Where “valid” means that no spoofing is detected and a 
valid solution for the antenna array attitude is obtained. 
The state “too few DOAs” indicates that no valid attitude 
solution is obtained and the number of DOA 
measurements available after the exclusion of biased 
measurements (𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋, at most) is too low, i.e. below 4. 
This state can be considered as the warning about a 
potential spoofing attack. The last, third possible state of 
the status flag is “spoofing” which is set if the SSE metric 
exceeds the spoofing detection threshold.  
 
 
 
a) set #1 
 
 
b) set #2 
Figure 6: SSE test metric and status flags 
 
As already discussed in [5], the DOA measurements 
delivered by the GALANT receiver show higher standard 
deviations of the DOA error as adopted in Figure 2. 
Therefore the elevation dependence of the DOA 
measurement error shown in Figure 2 was 
correspondingly scaled so that to avoid false alarm events 
in the interference free signal conditions. This adjustment 
resulted in 𝜎𝐷𝑂𝐴(𝐸𝑙 = 0°) = 6.9° and 𝜎𝐷𝑂𝐴(90°) = 3.3°. 
These settings were also used by post-processing the 
collected array data in the field trials under the meaconing 
conditions described in the next two sections.  
 
DETECTION PERFORMANCE,  
STATIC USER 
 
The measurement set-up used with a static user scenario 
is shown in Figure 7. For simplicity, a re-transmitter of 
GNSS in-air signals was built up and served as the source 
of interfering signals simulating a meaconing attack.  
 
 
a) view of measurements location 
 
b) zoomed view of transmitting antenna of repeater 
 
c) antenna arrays of GALANT receiver  
installed on the roof of measurement van 
Figure 7: Set-up used with static user tests 
 
A balloon was used as the carrier of repeater transmitting 
antenna. The receiving antenna was installed about 50 m 
away from the balloon base in order to avoid the self-
excitation through coupling between the repeater 
antennas. A low-noise amplifier was used to compensate 
for cabling losses in the re-transmitter signal chain. The 
power of re-transmitted GNSS signals was adjusted with 
the help of a variable attenuation to such a minimum level 
where the satellite channels of the GALANT receiver still 
could be captured by the repeater signals without losing 
the lock on the signals in tracking. 
 
The results obtained for SSE test metric, the status flags 
and the receiver estimated position are shown in Figure 8. 
It can be seen that the SSE metric (see Figure 8, a) 
changes by more than order of magnitude (please 
compare to Figure 6) when the repeater is switched on. 
Due to this, the time evolution of the status flag (see 
Figure 8, b) demonstrates a very clear transition from the 
“valid” to “spoofing” states. The effect of capturing the 
receiver tracking loops by the repeater signals can be also 
clearly observed in the estimated position (see Figure 8, 
c). It can be also observed that the detection of the 
presence of the repeater signals occurs simultaneously 
with the changes in the estimated position.  
 
 
a) SSE metric 
 
b) status flag 
 
c) position estimation by receiver 
Figure 8: Results of static user tests 
 
The exemplary results for the estimated directions of 
arrival of the GPS navigation signals before and after 
activating the repeater are shown in Figure 9. In the latter 
case, all estimated DOAs are located around one point on 
the skyplot (see Figure 9, b), which explains the observed 
large jump of SSE metric values.  
 
 
a) repeater is off 
 
b) repeater is on 
Figure 9: Examples of direction estimation results in 
repeater test for static user 
 
 
DETECTION PERFORMANCE,  
DYNAMIC USER 
 
In this test the balloon with the repeater transmitting 
antenna was fixed at the side of a rural road (see Figure 
10). The measurement van was driving along the street 
with the speed of approximately 40 km/h making a 
roundtrip (see Figure 11) and passing two times by the 
installation place of the balloon.  
 
The results obtained in the dynamic user scenario are 
shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13. Two time windows, 
each of approximately 50 s long, at which the effect of the 
repeater can be clearly seen, are marked in the figures 
with the help of half-transparent red blocks. It can be 
observed that the SSE test metric (see Figure 12,a) 
significantly grows in the time-windows with the repeater 
effect. This growth is especially large in the second 
window where the measurement van on the way back was 
on the road lane that is closer to the repeater installation 
(see Figure 10). The highest values of the SSE metric in 
both time windows are comparable to the corresponding 
values obtained in the static user scenario (see Figure 8, 
a). However, the time evolution of the status flag (see 
Figure 12, b) does not show such clear transitions 
between the “valid” and “spoofed” states as in Figure 8, b. 
 
Figure 10: View of measurement location used  
with repeater test for dynamic user 
 
 
Figure 11: Route of measurements van  
in dynamic user test 
 
The use of the simple re-transmitter as the spoofing 
source results in very unstable signal tracking while the 
tracking loops of the receiver are being captured by the 
repeater signals. This leads to often loss of locks and, 
because the direction finding is performed after the PRN 
code correlation, low number of DOA measurements 
available at a time. Please note that only satellites signals 
of GPS were used in these tests. The maximum number of 
the satellites in tracking at a time was not exceeding 8.  
 
As can be observed in Figure 12,c the proposed joint 
spoofing detection and attitude determination technique is 
still able to at least warn the user about the meaconing 
attack before the estimated user position is significantly 
spoofed. It is also noticeable that the SSE test statistic can 
recover from the repeater effect faster than the estimated 
user position. This can be clearly observed in the second 
half of the first time-window where the consistent 
solutions for the antenna attitude are often available (see 
Figure 13) while the positioning solution is still erroneous 
or unavailable. This is due to the fact that the information 
required for the DOA estimation and antenna attitude 
determination is generated at lower signal processing 
level as compared to the position estimation. Also, the 
attitude determination is more robust against spoofing of 
single navigation signals due to the exclusion procedure 
of “naturally” biased DOA measurements described 
above.  
 
 
a) SSE metric 
 
b) status flag 
 
c) position estimation by receiver 
Figure 12: Results of dynamic user tests 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, field test results for a technique proposed 
for joint spoofing detection and antenna array attitude 
determination have been presented. The tests were carried 
out using DLR’s proprietary multi-antenna receiver 
system. It has been shown that the tested technique is able 
to operate without false alarm events in interference-free 
signal conditions. This was achieved by corresponding 
scaling of the weighting function describing the 
dependence of the DOA measurement error on the 
satellite elevation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Results for antenna attitude  
in dynamic user tests 
 
Under meaconing conditions the tested technique was 
able to detect the presence of the re-transmitted GNSS 
signals by making use of their estimated directions of 
arrival. A clear transition to the “spoofing” alarm state 
was observed in the static user scenario. In the scenario 
with the dynamic user, clear transitions to the “spoofing” 
alarm state were often hindered by low available number 
of DOA measurements resulted from unstable signal 
tracking and frequent losses of lock. However, low 
availability of the DOA measurements in combination 
with the frequent losses of lock in the receiver tracking 
channels can also serve as a good warning about the 
spoofing attack.  
 
The following research topics can be addressed in the 
next studies:  
(i) extension of the DOA estimation for considering 
more than one propagation path per satellite; this is 
especially interesting with respect to mitigation of 
spoofing, it can also help to handle the DOA 
estimation errors due to multipath effect; 
(ii) use of the directional information about detected 
spoofing signals for their mitigation by generating 
spatial nulls in the reception pattern of the antenna 
array; 
(iii) accounting for electromagnetic mutual coupling 
between the array elements in the DOA estimation; 
(iv) considering the use of sequential attitude estimation. 
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